Various policy instruments have been developed to address environmental, social and economic issues in forest governance. Public governance instruments include command-and-control instruments and policies that influence forests either directly or indirectly. Voluntary instruments by non-state actors include various certification schemes and commodity roundtables. These policy instruments do not work in vacuum but interact throughout the regulatory process, where they can complement, substitute, and antagonize each other. At the same time there are global processes as well as innovations that contribute to changing the forest governance regimes at national level.
Introduction
The failure of governments to achieve a binding global forest convention in the 1992 Rio conference led a coalition of environmental, social and business activists to establish the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) (Humphreys, 2006) . Certification was the neoliberal answer to the failure of public policies to protect forest resources as it operates through the market and involves private sector in the standard setting (Auld, Gulbrandsen, & McDermott, 2008; Cashore, Auld, & Newsom, 2004) . Indeed, it was envisioned that certification could act as a substitute for missing or inadequate public regulation (Henson & Humphrey, 2010) , ensure market access for certified products in markets with high environmental awareness, and increase environmental and social sustainability in commodity trade (Elliott, 2000; Potts J et al., 2014) .
Substitution is only one of the ways in which public policies and other policy instruments interact. The others are complementarity and antagonism (Lambin et al., 2014) . The three types of potential interactions occur at various stages of the regulatory process: agenda setting and negotiation; implementation; and monitoring and enforcement. Two governance systems are complementary when they reinforce each other in the pursuit of a same policy goal. They can target either different actors, e.g. sanctioning those who break the law or bringing incentives to improve management, or different functions, e.g. certification can be used to prove compliance with legal requirements (Steering Committee of the State-of-Knowledge Assessment of Standards and Certification, 2012) . Substitution occurs when another governance entity replaces the private-led mechanism through policy learning or norm generation (Lambin, et al., 2014) , for example a requirement in a certification standard is adopted into national legislation. The initial private mechanism may maintain an informal role after a formal regulation takes over its function. Hence, substitution and complementarity may overlap. Finally, when two governance systems are antagonistic they can undermine each other at all stages of the policy process.
Besides the positive indirect effects certification may have on forest legislation, FSC has outlined four possible pathways to achieve positive impacts from "environmentally appropriate, socially beneficial and economically viable management of the world's forests" (FSC, 2015a) : 1) The engagement pathway which highlights engagement with stakeholders and seeks to enhance consensus among them;
2) The standards pathway in which impacts are based on moving from unknown practices to compliance with the standard; 3) The assurance pathway which focuses on the role of thirdparty verification instead of the assumed law enforcement; and 4) The market pathway that enables market advantages for products that come from responsibly managed forests.
In this paper we discuss how the governance regimes in Indonesia, Cameroon, and Peru have evolved to address biodiversity conservation and human livelihoods dependent on forests. We focus on FSC's forest stewardship certification as it is the main global certification scheme in the tropical region. The key questions that we answer are: 1) has FSC certification improved environmental and social performance in the study countries through the identified impact pathways; 2) what role do micro-and macrolevel processes play in the change; and 3) what are the interactions through which the change has occurred? The paper is structured as follows: first we give an overview of forest governance instruments with global bearing, and then we introduce the multi-level perspective framework. We move on to the country case studies before discussing their results in a broader context. (1995) (1996) (1997) was formed followed by another one, the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) . They both functioned under the auspices of the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) and provided a platform for further international forest policy development. In 2000 the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) was established by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC) to continue to promote "the management, conservation and sustainable development of all types of forests and to strengthen long-term political commitment to this end". The political commitment has not led to binding international legislation but the Non-Legally Binding Instrument on All Types of Forests (NLBI) was adopted in the Seventh Session of the UNFF in 28 April 2007 (United Nations, 2007 . The NLBI creates a framework for national action and international cooperation to enhance implementation of SFM.
International forest governance instruments

Regulatory approaches
Due to the lack of international binding agreements on forest, apart from CITES, regional and national regulatory approaches that have international bearing have been developed, notably by consumer countries such as the USA (e.g. with the 2008 amendment of the Lacey Act) or the EU (e.g. with the approval of the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade-FLEGT-Action Plan in 2003 (COM, 2003 ). The central focus of these approaches is however on illegal logging and the environmental, social and economic problems associated with it-thus a somewhat 'reduced' version of the more encompassing SFM concept discussed in Rio. The EU FLEGT Action Plan sets out actions to prevent the import of illegal wood into the EU, to improve the supply of legal timber and to increase demand for wood coming from responsibly managed forests. As a first step the European Council adopted a regulation on the establishment of a FLEGT licensing scheme for imports of timber into the European Community (EC, 2005) . The regulation establishes the FLEGT Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) as the vehicle to implement the licensing scheme between partner countries or regional organisations. The VPA is a legally binding trade agreement between the EU and individual timber exporting countries, which commit to ensure trade only in legal timber and to improve forest governance on their national territories (EC, 2007) . The first VPA was ratified by Ghana on 19 March 2010, followed by the Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Central Africa Republic and Liberia in Africa, and Indonesia in South-East Asia. As another component of the FLEGT Action Plan, the EU passed a timber regulation that came into force on 3 March 2013. The EU Timber Regulation prohibits operators in Europe from placing illegally harvested timber and products derived from illegal timber on the EU market. 'Legal timber' is defined as timber that is in compliance with the laws of the countries where it is harvested.
The Lacey Act was originally passed in 1900 to ban trafficking in illegal wildlife in United States of America. It was amended on 22 May 2008 to include a wider variety of prohibited plants and plant products, including timber and paper (Lacey Act amendments of 2008, 2008) . This amendment makes the policy capable of combating illegal logging. In addition to the ban on trading plants or plant products harvested in violation of the law, it requires declaration of the scientific name, value, quantity, and country of harvest origin for some products. As it is a fact-based statute with strict liability, no thirdparty verification (e.g. certification) can be used to prove legality under the Lacey Act. Similarly, Australia aligned its policies with EU and USA by adopting the Illegal Logging Prohibition Act (Illegal Logging Prohibition Act, 2012) on 29 November 2012. The act prohibits importing illegally logged timber and timber products and processing domestically grown raw logs that have been illegally logged.
Certification
The FSC founding assembly was held in 1993 and the FSC was established as a legal entity in 1994 (Figure 1 
Interactions through which forest governance regime evolves
The multi-level perspective (MLP) framework originates from technological transitions scholarship (Rip & Kemp, 1998 ) but provides a useful framework for understanding sustainability transitions in other contexts as well. It distinguishes three analytical levels: niches (micro-level), regimes (meso-level), and exogenous landscape (macro-level) (Geels & Schot, 2007) . Niches are where innovations occur and new private sector policy instruments are created. Public policies together with voluntary instruments used at the national level form the current forest governance regime in each country. The latter regime is embedded in the socio-technical landscape that includes societal values, political ideologies, macropolitical developments, and macro-economics.
Changes in the present governance regime occur through interacting processes within and between different governance levels ( Figures  2 and 3 ). Landscape level developments put pressure on the regime and create windows of opportunity for changes to occur in the regime, for example the pressure to implement SFM, combat deforestation and forest degradation that led to the creation of certification, which has since become part of the established forest governance regime in many countries.
Figure 2:
The multi-level perspective framework adapted from Geels and Schot (2007) . The socio-technical landscape includes macro-political developments whereas niche level is where innovations occur. Changes in the present governance regime occur through interacting processes within and between these levels.
Country case studies
The case studies are based on literature reviews of the forestry issues, forest policies, and certification in the study countries; forest statistics reports provided by government officials; 38 interviews with parties involved directly in forest certification; and the long-term experience of the authors with the forestry sector and forest certification in the study countries.
Development of certification
Peru
The movement for forest certification began in 1992 when the NGO Pronaturaleza was commissioned by government to undertake a consultation process on the feasibility of this sort of initiative. This process was conducted in parallel with the development of the sixth version of the principles and criteria for the sustainable management of natural tropical forest -a global initiative promoted by the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) -and nationally with initial discussions for the establishment of the forestry and wildlife law (LFFS according to its acronym in Spanish) enacted in 2000 (Arce, 1998 The following section discusses in more detail the application of the MLP to individual countries in the framework of evolving certification schemes, with a focus on Peru, Indonesia and Cameroon. By using case studies it is possible to detect commonalities as well as differences and draw lessons in moving towards sustainability in global forest resource governance. (Figure 4 ).
Forest governance PES
Indonesia
The Government of Indonesia (GoI) has been committed to sustainable forest management (SFM) since the early 1990s, as the follow-up to its commitments to sustainable development adopted from the Rio summit in 1992 and the ITTO 2000 target for SFM. Table 2 ).
The concerted efforts of government, the private sector, NGOs, and the international community are all considered as the drivers for FSC certification in Indonesia and as a result, some concessions had relatively better forest management practices than others (Ruslandi, 2015a Ruslandi (2015b) ; the certification cost for SVLK/PHPL, LEI and FSC was obtained from Astana et al. (2014) and Ruslandi et al. (2014) . concessions interested in FSC and sped up certification. Between 2010 and 2013, FSCcertified area more than doubled to 1,823,282 ha (5.1% of total production forest area) (Figure 4 ).
Cameroon
The history of forest certification in Cameroon can be traced through the appearance of the SFM paradigm that was adopted by 
The influence of FSC certification on forest governance
To analyze whether FSC certification has influenced forest governance in Cameroon, Indonesia and Peru we national regulations and requirements of the FSC standard. In Peru, the normative regime used was the LFFS (2000) and its respective regulations as well as other related legal instruments, together with the national FSC standard for forest management (FSC 2002) . In addition to the FSC principles, approaches to verification of legal wood sources under national regulation and the FSC scheme were analyzed. In Indonesia relevant national regulations were compared with the international FSC standard for forest stewardship version 5 (FSC, 2014), whereas in Cameroon the 1994 Forest Law and related implementing decrees were compared with the national FSC standard for forest management (FSC, 2012).
The requirements related to biodiversity conservation in the FSC standard go beyond government regulation in all three countries studied (Table 4) . FSC´s emphasis on longterm sustainability is inherent in the standard whereas this commitment is less clear in the public regulations. For example, in Indonesia Reduced Impact Logging (RIL) is used as a proxy for sustainable forest management (SFM) whereas in Cameroon no post-harvest inventory is required. In Peru there is a requirement to have sustainable management indicators but the estimate of a concession's productive potential is mainly based on secondary sources.
Although management plans are mandatory in all countries, the FSC standard gives more technical specifications and sets stricter conditions for operations. In Indonesia, there are no explicit regulations that require biodiversity conservation at the concession level although small portions of concessions should be set aside to protect genetic resources, and Evidence of balanced attention to social, ecological, and production issues. An internal monitoring and assessment system that allows identifying productive, biological, environmental and socioeconomic changes attributable to forest management against a set of minimal indicator proposed in the standard.
Results of monitoring are public and taken into account in periodic reviews of management plans. protection of flora and fauna is mentioned in the requirements for developing a monitoring plan. Also, High Conservation Values (HCVs) as a concept does not exist in public regulation in any of the three case study countries.
FSC standards also contain several clauses that go beyond normative requirements regarding human livelihoods. For example, in Indonesia legal rights of local communities, including indigenous people, are not recognized in many cases whereas the FSC standard requires that all activities that affect communities need to be preceded by community consultations with broad stakeholder participation. In Peru rights of local communities and indigenous people are recognized and include the requirement for free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) but no guidance exists to implement the FPIC process. None of the countries has a legal requirement for social impact assessment which is mandatory in the FSC standard.
Discussion
Improving social and environmental performance through FSC certification
Based on our analysis FSC has improved social and environmental performance in the study countries through the different impact pathways. The requirements for stakeholder engagement and consultations in FSC standards go beyond normative public regulations and there are indications that these requirements are translated into improved social well-being in the field. For example, in Indonesia FSC certification has contributed to improvements in forest governance indirectly by improving transparency, involving more stakeholders in forest management, providing more space for non-government organizations (NGOs) and other civil societies, and building trust among stakeholders (Muhtaman & Prasetyo, 2006; Ruslandi, et al., 2014) . In addition, FSC certification also reduced deforestation and incidence of air pollution and increased wellbeing of local communities (Miteva et al. 2015) . In Cameroon Cerutti et al. (2014) found that certified FMUs are consistently associated with better living and working conditions, presence of active local institutions, and the existence of a benefit-sharing mechanism. In Peru, Trujillo (2014) found better financial performance and working condition in those FSC certified concessions compared with those concessions that couldn't maintain the certification for over three years. Furthermore, certified concessions managers also recognized that the support that they receive from supporting certification initiatives allows them to improve their managerial and bargaining skills.
The standards and assurance pathways overlap to achieve intended sustainability impacts through third-party verification instead of assumed law enforcement. In our study countries certification requirements and their technical specifications are often more encompassing than those of public regulations (e.g. International Labour Organization's requirements), thus requiring higher environmental and social performance which in some cases has also been shown to happen (e.g. Cerutti, et al., 2014; Miteva, Loucks, & Pattanayak, 2015) . However, the assurance pathway seems to be even more important as implementation of public regulation is wanting, and the regulations themselves have gaps in monitoring. For example, the monitoring of post-logging activities is not included under regulation in Indonesia. The importance of the assurance pathway is increased by the timber procurement policies implemented in many timber importing countries, especially in Europe, as they can increase certification update and enhance the rulemaking authority of forest certification schemes (Gulbrandsen, 2014) . However, more stringent standards may also encourage exporting timber to economies with less stringent regulations, such as India and China, in favor of traditional timber export markets (Masiero, Pettenella, & Cerutti, 2015) .
The market pathway has been the weakest impact pathway to improve practices in the countries examined. Although market advantages and premium prices were intended to serve as an incentive for companies, it seems that it has rarely been the motivation to comply with certification requirements and to maintain certification. In Peru and Cameroon the companies that have been certified already had market access and used certification more as an assurance mechanism than a market access tool whereas in Indonesia the first certificate holders were already mainly compliant with the certification requirements due to the government initiative on SFM before using certification to gain access to European markets. Thus, certification was more an add-on benefit rather than an incentive to improve practices. Our findings confirm earlier results that although market advantages play a part in the motivation to get certified, it is not the most important motivation (Rickenbach & Overdevest, 2006) .
How did change occur?
When examining the development of certification through the lens of the multilevel perspective framework, there are clear similarities between the study countries but also marked differences. The appearance of the SFM paradigm provided a window of opportunity for certification, notably the FSC, in all of the countries but the route for certification to become an established part of the forest governance regime differs between them. Indeed, it can be even questioned whether certification is an established part of the regime or still trying to break into the regime.
In Peru, government has had a strong role as a supporter of certification from national to regional level from the beginning. Thus, certification has most likely had a positive knock-on effect on the public regulation as the processes to develop a national FSC standard. Revision of the forest law was conducted in parallel with some of the same actors involved. Indeed, some of the certification criteria are substituted by public regulation, such as the requirement for free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) and the rest are complementary.
In Cameroon certification was adopted rather late but has become an established part of the forest governance regime. The uptake has been led by companies that trade in European markets, and certification has been used to ensure a better implementation of the sustainable timber production paradigm. Although sustainability as a concept is deeply embedded in the legal framework of all study countries, timber harvesting in accordance with legal management plans can still be unsustainable (Cerutti, Nasi, & Tacconi, 2008; P. O. Cerutti, L. Tacconi, R. Nasi, & G. Lescuyer, 2011) . Hence, certification can be seen as a complementary instrument, especially in the monitoring and enforcement phase of the regulatory process.
In Indonesia we see a different narrative. From early on the government has been focusing on its own certification programmes although it worked with donor countries to develop models of SFM which acted as a spring board for the concessions involved to gain FSC certification. Similarly, the private sector developed its own certification programme rather than embracing the FSC as in Peru. Thus, in Indonesia FSC certification is still, after 18 years from the first certificate issued, more a niche innovation trying to break into the market than an established part of the governance regime which is also evident from the lack of a national FSC standard. Furthermore, there is tension between public regulation and the FSC standard as there are some FSC rules that contradict national regulations (e.g., silviculture intensification rules require higher logging intensities contradicting research recommendations) (Ruslandi et al. 2014 ).
Although NGOs have played an important role in building support for certification, it is the macro-level processes and, at least in the initial stages of certification, trade development that seem decisive in the adoption and maintenance of certification. In Peru reforms towards market liberalization coincided with emergence of certification. These reforms were embraced and ever since Peru has been one of the most successful countries at confining protectionist pressures within formal trade remedy mechanisms and maintaining a liberal trade system (Finger, 2015) . In Cameroon political reforms were undertaken concurrently with those in Peru but there was a lack of government commitment to move beyond serving the diverse private interests in society (Essama-Nssah & Gockowski, 2000) . In Indonesia economic liberalization had happened in 1970 but the lack of democratic institutions and transparent practices may have contributed to the government's willingness to build its own certification programme. Even more so, the Ministry of Forestry did not want to lose its most powerful tool vis-à-vis other state agencies --the power to regulate transnational actors in pursuit of its policy goals (Giessen, Burns, Sahide, & Wibowo, 2016) .
Currently the majority of Indonesian timber is either used domestically or exported into other Asian countries. Therefore, it is unlikely that market pressure will force timber producers in Indonesia to improve their forest management practices unless Japan and China commit to purchasing only legal and sustainable timber products. If at the same time the VPA between the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the EU allows Indonesian timber products to enter the EU market with only GoI's legality compliance, and if there is no premium price for FSCcertified timber, it is likely that timber producers in Indonesia will abandon FSC certification, which requires a larger effort and higher costs (Ruslandi, et al., 2014) . In contrast, in Peru the US has been a major supporter of certification and an important trade partner at the same time. Although the money flows are separate, the focus placed on certification by the US has been reinforced by both channels. (Matten & Moon, 2008) . For example, in Peru the trust in market-oriented responses to regulatory problems is evident from of the concessionaries' belief that the government must have a predominant role in promoting the certification standard by limiting participation in public purchases of timber or derived products to FSC-certified products (Trujillo, 2014) . Thus, although they believe that government must exercise control over production conditions, the actual improvement in management practices is best done through complementary market mechanisms with third-party verification of implementation of the required management practices. However, at the same time, limiting participation in public timber procurement would level the playing
[I]t is unlikely that market pressure will force timber producers in Indonesia to improve their forest management practices unless Japan and China commit to purchasing only legal and sustainable timber products.
field for those already certified as one of their concerns has been that they don't perceive any economic advantage to maintain the FSC certification in the markets in which they participate, considering the costs related with it.
Conclusions
Looking at the development of certification and comparing government regulations and FSC certification standards, this paper explored how the governance regimes in Indonesia, Cameroon, and Peru have evolved to address biodiversity conservation and human livelihoods dependent on forests.
There are three pathways (through cooperation, indifference or competition) for translation of certification standards and processes into current forest governance regimes based on government support: 1) Cooperative in Peru where the government has been a strong supporter of certification from the beginning and where the main interactions between certification and national public regulations are substitution and complementarity;
2) Indifference in Cameroon where certification is mainly complementary to public regulations and certification uptake is led by private companies; and 3) Competition in Indonesia where government has built its own certification programmes and there exists antagonism between some of the public regulations and FSC certification, in addition to some complementarity. The pathway seems to be determined by macro-political development, trade opportunities, and cultural values but also by governments' willingness to transfer regulatory power to private governance schemes.
What has emerged from these transitions is a patchwork forest governance regime within which various policy instruments interact to achieve the overall goal of sustainable forestry. Certification-as a market-driven, voluntary governance system-is just one of the tools that can be used to improve environmental and social sustainability within forest governance. Standard public policies can be another such tool. These tools can be complementing each other or, in some cases, they may set in motion deleterious antagonist processes. For example, although in theory both systems (the private and the public) aim at promoting and implementing SFM, findings indicate that the former has had better impacts than the latter (in study countries) in improving private companies' behaviours and business models. These findings are particularly relevant in the context of the recent national and international responses to environmental issues such as illegal logging, which rely very much on the implementation of laws and regulations. While in theory (i.e. in the letter of the law) the latter are built on SFM principles, in practice their bar may not be set high enough to ensure that SFM is actually implemented (McDermott, Cashore, & Kanowski, 2009; Viktor, 1999) . More research is thus needed to understand when and where such antagonism is occurring, in order to be able to set in motion policy processes (both private and public) aimed at curbing it.
